Sharecroppers Life in 1911
Housing supplied to the farm workers, according to Farm Security Administration FSA surveys, was described as crude shacks. A typical housing unit for Bootheel farm workers could be described as an unpainted wooden structure without plastering or insulation. This is only part of the picture. While many of the white owners and renters lived in “Weatherboard” house consisting of a single frame with drop siding, this was not true of white croppers. Laborers and blacks lived in even worse conditions. They lived neither in “strip” or “box” structures. Both were nothing more than rough timber placed together vertically, the first with stripping over the cracks to keep out the weather, the latter, had no such stripping. Some of the inside walls were bare. Others were covered by old newspaper of pieces of cardboard or building paper.
Concrete blocks lifted the building off the ground several feet to keep them above the water during times of flooding. In the Lowland, cellars were unheard of because of the high water table. Rolled tar-paper covered many of the roofs, cheap shingles on others. When damaged few roofs were repaired. These covering afforded little protection from the weather.
Farm Security Administers surveying these houses described then as a picture of squalor, filth, and poverty. Floors usually were made with a single layer of rough green, unseasoned lumber that warped as it dried leaving cracks that exposed the ground. Homemade tables and box-crate cabinets make up the furniture. Children, it was not unusual, to find sleep on blankets or pallets spread out on the cracked board floors.
Because of the conditions of the housing, health problems were epidemic. Two-thirds of all deaths due to disease between 1910 and 1935 in the state of Missouri were in the Bootheel. Cases of typhoid, tuberculosis and pneumonia ran far beyond the state average. All these diseases were preventable and were attributed to pool living standards, lack of medical care, and inadequate nutrition.
Insects created health problems in summer as did heating difficulties in winter. Inadequate screening in the summers compounded the problem. Among the houses with screens, most were in disrepair offering little resistance to flies and mosquitoes. Feeling it was a waste of time and money; overlords were reluctant to fix screens. Why put up screen doors if they are going to leave the open was the rational of overseer for not adjusting the problem.
Ninety-eight percent used outside toilet facilities that were open, unscreened, and too close to their water supply. This accounted for the large Number of cases of typhoid fever, dysentery, hookworm, and other intestinal health problems plaguing the area. Drainage ditches that were not regularly cleaned out became breeding places for mosquitoes.
Hookworms were a disease little was known about until 1901. So insidious were its effects, along with pellagra and malaria, they were known as the “scourge of the South.” Nesting in the intestinal tract, the parasite lived off the host’s blood, causing loss of energy, weakness, dullness, stunted grown and anemia. Infected children had retarded physical and mental growth. Children suffering from the parasite lagged behind in their school work. Death from this is possible but rare. Hookworm was called the “germ of laziness.”
Hookworms were most commonly found in rural school children who went without shoes. Eggs of the invader passed through the feces and breed in the unsanitary privies. Then the newly hatched larva lived in the soil around the house to enter the host through bare feed to enter the bloodstream and settle in the intestine. Infestation rates among children ran as high a 90 percent in some areas of the Bootheel while the average was 40 percent of the children.
Pellagra, like hookworm, was endemic in the South, including the Bootheel. This disease was caused by poor nutrition, specifically a shortage of niacin due to general poverty and the high consumption of corn products such as cornbread, hominy, and grits. One study showed the death rate for all age groups, regardless of residence, was 11.61 per 100,000 for whites and 39.47 for blacks. Pellagra deaths were five times higher on farms. Cases of typhoid, tuberculosis and pneumonia also ran far above the state average.
In the Bootheel the traditional diet of the tenant farmer was salt pork, corn pone, and dried beans usually cooked in pork fat. Eggs, butter, milk, fresh vegetable and fruit were rarely available. Some of the households had cows and chickens; usually they were too small in Number to provide large scale of regular consumption. Gardens were also rare and too small to be adequate.
Food preservation also presented a major problem. In the summer time, it was insurmountable. Pits were sometime dug under the house in the shad. Another method frequently use was to place perishables in a tub of water also placed under the house. Neither of these methods was good for more than a few hours. FSA reports point out that improper preservation of food and diet were the chief factors causing the infant mortality rate that in some counties to be twice as high as the state average.
Even though the Bootheel, infant death rate was high, among tenant farmers the population continued to grow rapidly. This population rise was higher among the white farmers as the infant death rates were higher among the Negro families.
Large families were considered an economic asset by the landlords. This meant there were more hands to work in the fields’ during labor peak seasons. Landlords saw these large Numbers as a bigger labor force at a minimum cost. In this way the high birth rate tended to perpetuate the conventional economic system.
The Bootheel had a caste system develop were the tenant families had little hope of ever changing their condition. Most were forced to drop out of school early because their families needed their labor to survive. Education, therefore, did not have a high priority among farm tenants and labors.
All the families in Dunklin, New Madrid, and Pemiscot on average only completed five years and five months of school. This was the center of the cotton growing area. The black children had much worse average of two years and six months. Because of the poor condition of the school system the children received very little education even when in the classroom. Yet, Negro’s had fewer opportunities of learning because is even more inefficient grade schools, inadequate books and facilities.
In 1929 the Missouri legislature passed a law separating blacks from white schools making integrated education unlawful. White students could only go to all white schools. Likewise, black children could attend only school designated for blacks.
FSA reports recorded public education in the Little River Lowland as a system of elementary education in a multiplicity of school districts. With one-room, one-teachers, unapproved schools having poorly trained and low-paid teachers with the students’ irregular attendance, educational efforts did all but not exist. Only 24 schools out of a total of over 400 located in rural districts of the Bootheel met State Department of Education standards for elementary schools. This indicated the majority of the rural school children attended buildings that were in deteriorated conditions with a shortage of equipment such as books and libraries.
Teacher training was also inadequate. One-seventh of teachers had completed college; a Number of them had attended one or two years of post-high school education. Twenty percent of the teachers had no college training at all, several of these teachers never completed high schools.
Students’ were being kept out of school to do field work was a common practice. Rural students attended school on the average just over half the school sessions reported the FSA. During the planting season in spring and during the fall and winter harvest, schools were not in session. Therefore, school was held in the hot humid days of summer when the students present were not required to work in the fields. Electric fans were unheard of. Nearly one-half of the high school age children in the six Bootheel counties resided in areas with no high schools. A poor transportation system was also a discouragement to those who might otherwise want to attend.
As bad as conditions were for white students, they were even worse for Negros. The FSA found that the system of public education for backs to be far inferior to that provided for whites. In the entire area, only six high schools were provided for blacks. In Dunklin and Stoddard counts none were provided. Their teachers were not as well trained as in the white schools; the building and facilities were less adequate. Teacher salaries were not on par. The average salary for Negro teachers in these areas was $370 per year compared to $500 for white teachers. Illiteracy rate for white and blacks tenants in the Bootheel was far below the state average; in some counties running as high as 10 percent below the average.
As often happens is poverty areas crime and violence goes hand and hand with ignorance. Shootings, knifing, and lynching’s were common. In Pemiscot County by 1911 in one ten day period of January there were three murders, two in two day in March, and two more within ten day in September. There were numerous other attacks in which the victims survived. Many conflicts were unreported in the black community.
Parma was a New Madrid County sawmill town. By 1911, with most of the timber gone, farming became the dominate industry. Acquiring labor became a problem. One farmer, H. R. Post, owned almost 1,000 acres. He offered to pay between $1.50 to $2.00 a day for help in harvesting corn and clearing the land. He thought the ex-sawmill men he hired wanted to collect maximum wages for minimum work as not much harvesting was done.
A black worker was brought in. his first day on the job; the Negro was attacked from behind with a beer bottle. Post complained to U.S. Marshall in St. Louis that the life of one of his black worker had been threatened openly by saloon loafers and gambles. Post was informed, by locals, not only was any black man he hired would die as was his life in danger as was your farm animals and your barns in danger of catching fire.
One of the offenders told one of the Parma bank cashiers that since he probably would be fined for his unlawful activates; he may as well make it worth his time by killing Post. After the cashier warned his friend, Post went arms after that.
His father was afraid the threat against his son would be carried out and asked the Governor Herbert S. Hadley for protection. In his letter he told the governor, “I put in something over four years on the Union side in the Civil War, but in a week just past I have suffered in spirit more than during the war that saved the Nation.”
Post found no public official, not even the governor, willing to protect him or his interest. Local officials were even less willing to help. Post complained that he was at a great disadvantage as the city marshal the constable and two aldermen were all elected from the people that opposed the employment of Negroes. In fact they were encouraging the mobs with one alderman personally threaten the Negro.
When Governor Hadley was asked to intervene he said he was unable to do no more than inform the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of New Madrid County and call all the National Guard if there was violence. However, he did more than that. He sent the state adjutant general F. M Rumbold to investigate.
As fate would have it, as Rumbold exited the train in Parma, two black men had also got off that Sunday afternoon. He arrived just as a local mob assaulted the two men. In the excitement, the townspeople in the excitement of the event talked freely. Thus Rumbold easily collected the name of the men in the anti-Negro crusade, even the leaders.
Tobe Oller was the ringleader. He had a reputation as a loafer and gamble. Rumbold informed the governor that Oller livelihood came from getting the mill hands drunk then robbing them in a game of craps.
Rumbold told Parma’s farmers, storekeeper, bankers and real estate men there would not be any economic progress as long as the area did not hire Negro labor. The marshal and county constable told him they would not protect blacks brought in by the planters. To do so, they both told him, would be political suicide. After Governor Hadley heard this from his agent in the field, he took no action on any complain he heard from New Madrid County.
This was not an isolated incident. The night of September 11, 1911, white terrorist struck the Scrub Ridge areas in southern New Madrid County intimidating black brought in to pick cotton. That night, four Negros received gunshot wounds and hundreds of imported black labors fled the region.
In Pemiscot County a few weeks later, cotton pickers employed on another large plantation was stampeded because of violence against them. Before they escaped into Portageville, they were caught and beaten again. Episodes such as these were played down by newspapers as being economic motivated. When the New Madrid Weekly Record admitted there was much violence in the county they claimed they never heard “That the labor question was involved”
A Caruthersville attorney, C. G. Shepard, told a different story. He informed the governor that the real truth was the prosecuting attorney was protecting the lynchers and has no plans to bring the mob to trial.
Believing they understand the situation, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on October 12, 1911, asked Governor Hadley to take some action as the authorities in the Bootheel would not. The governor issued a statement that in cases of this nature he had limited powers. He could not remove local elected officials; however, he could off $300 reward and returned the problem to the local community urging Judge Charles Farris to convene a grand jury.
The grand jury was called as the governor suggested. It begins work in September and finished in mid-December. An editorial in the Caruthersville Pemiscot Argus, December 14, observed that if the purpose to the grand \jury was to gloss the local events over, then they did their job.
Back in October, a few days after the lynching a notable change for the better was observed by the editor of the Caruthersville Democrat. Negroes were leaving town in groves. They are leaving by train, boat and no vagrants could be seen in the streets and alleys. Of the black men left in town, they had a job or seeking one. This, he claimed, was a higher and better system.
Judge Charles Faris saw what was happening and in his outrage that September he called for a grand jury during the Session of the circuit court. He wanted to bring legal action against the offenders. Foreman of the grand jury was Seth S. Barnes, president of the Marston Cooperage Company. Barnes like other employers wanted the county’s lawbreakers brought under control. They wanted to employee blacks so they could be exploited.
Barns told Governor Hadley that these mobs are almost entirely made up of irresponsible hoodlums. They will only work long enough to make money for a sack of flour and a piece of meat and then looked to cause trouble. Barnes then suggested the troublemakers be ran from the county or made to feel the heavy weight of the law.
However, Barnes as foreman of the grand jury, for all his desire to control the situation all his efforts for indictments were met with obstacle. Neither the county court nor the attorney-general office were willing to co-operate while the prosecuting attorney maintained other matters were more pressing and did not have time to investigate. Then six days into deliberation, Barnes discovered one of his grand jurors was one of the terrorists. . Before the court term ended not a single indictment was returned.
Determined to have the cheap labor from the Negro’s, Barnes arranged for a grand jury at the next term of court. He also had a promise from the attorney-general’s office of assistance. Twenty-seven indictments were returned during the November court session. In the March, 1912, trial it was agreed that Jay Allen and Robert Crosser would be the first cases tried. After the jury quickly acquitted the first two defendants the prosecution dropped the others cases. This decision was an important victory for the night riders in New Madrid County. They took it to mean they could continue handling the Negro problem any way they wanted without interference from the law.
Meanwhile in Pemiscot County the situation had become much worst. In the fall of 1911 a lynching climaxed the racial tension. With the start of the cotton picking season, the poor white of the area posted signs throughout the county warning migratory blacks to stay away. When posted warnings failed to discourage the Negroes the whites turned nigh-riders to put hunt into the warning.
In Pemiscot County the mobs were from the same class and interest as those in New Madrid County. Prosecuting Attorney J. S. Gossom informed the governor, “They are composed of tenants and laborers who think if the Negroes were out of the county they could bet better wages for picking cotton and get cheaper rent.” But when Gossom and other public men talked to the press they were less candid saying that the mobs were made up of “best citizens” whose sole interest was the moral welfare of the community.
Night riders justified their action on moral grounds. In their view, migratory Negroes were not bona fide laborers, but vicious blacks from the city slums specialist in gambling and vice. In the Caruthersville Democrat the editorial explained “they come under the pretension of cotton pickers, but in reality to prey upon those who work, and leave a path marked with every conceivable crime.
October 12, 1911 in an effort to ward off trouble the Caruthersville Mayor Barrett advised property owners not to rent housing to blacks. The explained he was afraid their building would be set aflame and the fire hoses cut, costing the city $1,000 to replace the fire equipment.
Planters and landlords, whose profits depended on the Negroes’ presence, ignored this advice. They encouraged the blacks to come with offers of jobs and housing. Mayor Barrett was right. Early in October a Negro knifed two white barbers outside a saloon in a street fight. This incident was used to incite a mob.
In the Caruthersville Democrat article reporting the brawl the writer affirmed that as there were no state laws sufficient to handle this situation, the good lawful citizens of the community need to correct the situation by applying a “higher law”. Few whites misunderstood what the editor meant. Just the year before, Editor W. R. Lacey had written in a similar instance something to the effects that while the Democrat does not believe in Judge Lynch there are however times when the people of this region are put to unnecessary expense when some people are given a legal trial.
Law enforcement officers at Caruthersville in fear of their prisoner moved him 25 miles west to Kennett. The next night, some 40 white men came after the prisoner. Learning he had been taken out of town they commandeered a railroad engine and coach and headed to Kennett. When the news reached Kennett ahead of the train, the prisoner was removed from jail and hidden. Despite the mob’s badgering and threats the Kennett law officers refused to disclose the Negros' location. Finally, bitter, frustrated and thirsting for revenge, the would-be lynchers returned home.
Before long other Negroes caught the attention of the Caruthersville police. It was a Tuesday, October 10, when a drifter, a Negro cotton picker, Ben Woods was arrested allegedly for following a white woman. A white man she worked with in the county clerk’s office reported Woods following her made her excessively nervous and triggers her long time fear of being molested or robbed by a black man.
Normally, to calm her fears, the coworker walked her home. However, that night her coworker was unable to. Woods walked behind her that evening. In distressed panic she called the police reporting he had an evil purpose in mind. When the grand jury heard the case they found he charged unfairly. The foreman told Governor Hadley the man simply happened to be walking behind her.
Another Negro, A. B. Richardson was arrested that same evening and charged with stealing bundle of merchandise. Well known to the police, Richardson had a history of drunkenness and other minor offenses. He had been warned to leave town before it was time to pick cotton, but had refused to go. Making his situation more unstable was his reputation for insulting whites when he had been drinking heavily, which meant often.
Within hours of two men
s arrest a group of white mens' gained entry into the jail, removing the Negroes, now being held for his protection. The white rage was against Woods as his crime was against a white woman. This type of crime was more serious than Richardson’s thief of property. The mob was spending their anger against Woods by beating him and would probably have murder him. However, Richardson started making uncomplimentary remarks about his captors, thus distracting their attention away from Woods. Then they turned their attention to Richardson.
A search party found Richardson’s body the next morning in the Mississippi River. A fifty foot trail of blood away from the river bank confirmed their brutality. Richardson’s death, according to a grand jury, was from unknown causes. The October 14, 1911 edition of the Caruthersville Pemiscot Argus reported his death was caused by too much drank. The paper speculated that after a well-deserved whipping, he went to the river bank to drink and lost his balance, falling in.
In an interview the day after the lynching with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch Mayor Barrett and Prosecuting Attorney Gossom said that not legal action was expected again the “good citizens” that made up the mob. In Gossom’s report to the governor, he claimed that none of the mob’s name was known so no legal action could be taken against the lynchers. Because so many, he report claimed, citizen sympathized with the marauders, no legal action was possible. A jury would acquit them if they were brought to trial.
In as effort to shift responsibility away for local authorizes, Gossom suggested the governor to call in federal authorities to take the mob leaders into custody. Gossom pretended he had already done his best to calm the situation and to bring the guilty parties to justice.
About a month later the vigorous crusader against saloons and friend of any movement leading to moral improvement, H. E. Averill, editor of the Pemiscot Argus, could not agree to the fiction that the nigh triders’ campaign of terror improved the moral tone of the community. He disagreed that those blacks leaving town after the lynching were not saloon loafer and gamblers, but industrious cotton pickers. His suspicion was that the white mobs were more interested in eliminated competing labor force and had nothing to do with improving the moral tone of the community.
This wave of violence spread throughout the Bootheel during the harvest season of 1911. The disastrous spring flood brought it was an end to the violence as it forced men to work together in a common cause. The pattern of hostility had only temporarily been interrupted. During the following years violence became accepted as a way of life by the victim.
Levees and Flooding in Southeast Missouri
The first flood after the Levee District was organized occurred in May of 1893.As this was not a major flood and no levee work that had been done by the Levee Board, the Levee District was not overflowed.
Four years after the Levee District was organized, 1897, a great flood occurred. A continuous levee, 47 miles, between Point Pleasant to the Arkansas state line had been completed; three levee breaks occurred on this new levee. On March 18, at levee mile 30, at Caruthersville a 3,050 feet wide breach occurred. March 24, at the 44th levee mile, Lindale, a 1,280 foot breach, and the same day at the 46 mile marker, Midway, a 1,350 feet of levee washed away.
The Flood of 1897 generated a lot of interest in flood control. Several ideas were examined. The idea of using cut-offs to shorten the river was brought up again. Most engineers believed the idea was not practical. They argued the disadvantages out weight what would be gained. The disadvantages would be a change in river slope, increased current, and decreased water levels, especial in low water periods. After all, navigation was the first concern of the nation, not flood control.
One on the many novel and unaccepted ides proposed in the Senate was the construction of seven or eight parallel levees, placed at right angles to the Mississippi River from the river bank all the way across the St. Francis Basin to Crowley's Ridge. While the idea was not unsound, was flood waters would be captured\temporarily between the levees to be released after the water receded.
The Subcommittee of the Committee on the Commerce of the U. S. Senate in their December of 1898 report endorsed the concept of levees to improve the rivers. Slowly over the years the Mississippi River Commission’s thinking had evolved into a levee only policy.
The National government made its first levee expenditure along the upper St. Francis District, 18 million dollars. Fragmented levees were joined and over the next several years and raised until the levee line reached 87 miles
After a swift and undemanding victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, confidence was restored in American with the county entered an Era of Good Feeling. Federal purse string loosened for internal improvement.
Experiments were resumed in the area of Plum Point in Arkansas and other areas, particularly Point Pleasant. These area were especially dangerous to river traffic as they were areas were towheads and sandbars formed changing the channel frequently. Dikes with abates type (barriers of sand, rock, ect.) were constructed to close off secondary channels. This was only partially successful.
In 1890, one of the engineers’ successes was at Cherokee Cross about 90 miles below Cairo near Little Prairie. Here a secondary chute was closed with complete success.
At Hickman, Kentucky, slightly north and east of New Madrid, levee breaches poured 14 feet of water in the town.
Before the 1912 flood damage repairs were completed the valley was hit by the Great Flood of 1913.
The floods of 1912 and 1913 were costly. They left the levee district on the Mississippi River Valley financial done in. Urgent calls were made for federal financial aid to build a levee system. The 1912 Congress appropriated less money for River and Harbors than any time since the depression year of 1894. Memphis, the Mississippi River Levee Association was founded. Their purpose was to lobby for a federal flood control bill.
Lobbing efforts paid off with the Flood Control Act of 1917. Now, for every dollar provided locally, the national government would supply two. However, the United States entry into World War I during 1917 and 1918, interrupted federal funds. Thus, only $17 million of the promised $30 million was spent on flood control.
More federal money, $60 million spent over a ten year period, was promised in the Flood Control Act of 1923.This was to be spent on levee construction, not navigational improvements. When the levee reaches the height of 22 feet, the people of the Mississippi River Valley bottomlands felt secure behind their levee.
At this time three widely held beliefs concerning major floods on the Mississippi. First assumption was that unless the Ohio River Valley provided extensive water, there can be no major flood. Second, it was believe that all the major tributaries would produce floods at the same time. Third, that if such an event happened, it would be slow about coming down river giving the Lower Mississippi residents ample warming. All three misconceptions were proven wrong in 1927.
No one imagine anything like the 1927 flood which would prove to be the most destructive in the history of the bottomlands. It began in the fall and winter months of 1926. Heavy rains bombard the central United States, bloating the upper tributaries of the Mississippi River.
Between December 18, 1926 and April 30, 1927, rain falling on the Mississippi River drainage basin added up to a total of 144.4 cubic miles. To help understand this Number, compare it to the total movement of water going by the Gulf Stream through the Straits of Florida in 24 hours; 3.7 cubic miles less that the rain fall.
The flood came in three waves. By April enough rain had fallen over the 1,240,000 square miles the Mississippi and its tributaries drain in 32 states and two Canadian provinces, to cover the area in nearly one foot of water, if spread evenly throughout the area. Even after evaporation and absorption, more than 60 cubic miles of water had to reach the Gulf of Mexico.
New Year’s day, 1927, the Mississippi River at Cairo reached flood stage. This was the earliest on record. By April 15, the entire Mississippi Valley from Cairo to the Gulf of Mexico was at flood stage.
During the 1927 flood at Cairo the river was against the levee 88 days; New Madrid 108 days; Memphis 107 days; Helena 11 days, Yazoo City and Vicksburg 166 days; and at New Orleans 120 days. Each day the river was against the water saturated levees increases the danger of levee failure. And the levee did fail.
The levee that protected Southeast Missouri, Eastern Arkansas, Northwestern Mississippi, and Northeast Louisiana was threatened by the Mississippi. On April 16, the River won, at Dorena, Missouri, 33 miles below Cairo, the levees broke. This was a small unincorporated community in southeastern Mississippi County, Missouri. The District Engineers had recognized a problem here.
The United States Coast Guard Steamer Kankakee was in the area to remove people from the endangered area. Floodwaters covered 135,000 acres of land in the St. John Levee and Drainage District, leaving 7,500 people homeless.
St. Johns Bayou Basin has a different development. Usually the drainage ditches carry headwater flooding from a region and surrounding upland successfully transmit excess surface run-off into the Mississippi River by way of St. Johns Bayou pass through simple gravity gates in the setback levee just east of New Madrid. However, to prevent backwater flooding from overwhelming the St. Johns Basin the gates must be closed when the water level of the Mississippi exceed that of the bayou.
With the flood gates manually closed, headwaters are no longer able to escape into the Mississippi. Thus, accumulated water behind the gates and along the drainage ditches threaten the bayou’s levee system. Then some 10,000 area are subject to 2-year floods while 55,000 acres are threatened to a 30 plus year floods. After a Corps study in 1968, no recommendation for changes were advised.
At this point, the levee was not very tall and people were in the process of enlargement at the time of the break. Before the high water a section of the levee had been removed for repair. Lose sandbags were piled in the low place. When the water got high at this place, water started seeping through. More sandbags were quickly added. Before long, in spite what 30 blacks filling sandbags could do, a stream of water broke through.
Water eat away a big gap formed into a crevasse and to levee was gone with a roar described as sounding like a tornado. 1,000 feet of levee went as if it was made of paper. After the original rupture the dirt wall crumbled into the water at the rate of one foot every fifteen minutes.
There was a small group of trees on the land side of the levee and the rushing water knocked them down as if they were no more than paper. The water carried everything in from of it. The roar of the water kept getting louder. It kept piling through the crevasse like some wild things that was escaping from a pen. Water was a solid wall as it rushed over the land a far as you could see. Buildings were engulfed under water as if they were not there. Chicken, pigs, and cows disappeared, lost forever. A 20 foot high, or higher, wall of water rushed across the land. Fifteen miles away at East Prairie the Cade School House was “beat” down by the rushing water.
Three days later the levee ridge was topped between New Madrid and Farrenburg. Vast amounts of water rushed into the St. Francis River Basin. One million acres of Southeast Missouri and Northeast Arkansas was flooded.
By April 20th water inside New Madrid was one-and-a –half foot higher than in the Mississippi River in front of the town. The Corp of Engineers sent workers with dynamite to the area. They blasted the levee at the southern end of St. John’s Bayou to allow the water to return to the river.
With the crevasse at Dorena, 300 additional levee guards were added to watch the Lower St. Francis levee along with an additional 25 engineers and inspectors. Near Deering, Pemiscot County, on Little River Drainage District’s Main Ditch Number 8’s levee was blown by unidentified persons. The crevasses’ roar was reported to have been heard over a half mile away. The gap decayed at a rate of four feet per hour.
On May 8, 1927, at the height of the “Flood” earth tremors along the New Madrid Fault was felt over a 250 mile radius. It topped chimneys and shook pictures off the walls. Two days later, a tornado traveled roughly along the St. Francis River.
Health problem accompanied the high water. Drinking water had to be boiled before use. Pellagra became a problem. Red Cross workers gave immunization against infectious diseases.
The magnitude of the flood and resulting disaster of 1927 brought home to the nation at last the realization the problems of the Mississippi River were national problems. To was not a problem solely restricted to a local region as the Mississippi River received waters from at least two-thirds of the states composing the Nation at the time. Herbert Hoover, in charge of relief during the crisis, called for prompt and effective flood control legislation and levee repair whether or not under federal jurisdiction.
The Mississippi River Commission before the 1927 Flood had a policy of levees only policy for flood control. After wards, they were forced to re-examine this thinking. As levees could only be constructed to a certain height before their usefulness became questionable, they were not adequate.
Thus, a levee only policy was abandoned with the enactment of the Flood control Act of May 25, `1928. This act not only enlarged the levees but also included the structure of floodways and spillway. The law authorized large-scale revetments (protection of the banks with willow mats or concrete pads), along with dredging and training works that confine the river to a fixed channel.
The 1928 act was a variation of the Jadwin Plan General Jadwin had lobbied for this plan for years. He had belittled the levees only plan for years. To him, building levees big and high enough to control another 1927 flood was too costly. He wanted to enforce the existing levees and supplement their protection with floodways and spillways.
President Coolidge had submitted the Jadwin Plan on December 8, 1927 with the recommendation that local interest should provide at least 20 percent of the funding. While the nation, he believed, should pay for flood protection along the Mississippi even if only a small part of the nation received any benefit.
Senator Hawes of Missouri characterized the plan as the engineers’ efforts to gain power while lessening civilian control of the flood control program. He claimed that the Engineers were endeavoring control a very serious national problem without entirely presenting the river situation in its true light. He was totally against the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. Here, a setback levee parallels the mainline levee from Birds Point to New Madrid with a 1,500 foot levee gap that would be blown to protect Cairo if determined necessary. This plan, he declared, would destroy Southeast Missouri and is unacceptable to the people of the state.
Senator Hawes, after condemning the Jadwin Plan presented his own. He flood control bill called for expending one billion dollars with one-hundred million being spent annually. Senators from Arkansas and Tennessee jointed in denouncing the plan. The Senate passed the bill by a vote o 70-0 on March28, 1928 under the name of the Jones Bill.
President Coolidge called the bill the most vicious piece of pork barrel legislation ever devised by Congress and threaten to vote it if chances were not made. In the House, Representative Strong of Kansas led the opposition. He called the Jones-Reid Bill corrupt and declared “a dozen Teapot domes” were wrapped up in the bill.” April 24, 1928 ignoring a threat by the President, the House voted 254 to 90 passed the bill. A fore night later, a joint committee presented the bill to Coolidge, who signed it the next day.
The Flood Control Act of 1928 provided for a three-member commission, including the Chief of Engineers, president of the Mississippi River Commission and a civil engineer appointed by the President. The commission was to decide the method of flood control with no local contribution required by law. Maintain of all flood control works, after completion would be done by states or levee districts. Land for spillways would be owned by the federal government.
The plan from Cape Girardeau to the mouth of the Arkansas River required raising the levees from zero to two feet at Birds Point. The floodway from Birds Point to New Madrid would be five miles wide with a capacity of carrying about 450,000 cubic feet per second to protect Cairo. Fuse plug levees were to be constructed at each end to an elevation about five feet below grade of the setback levee.
Unlike the 1927 flood which struck the land suddenly and violently, the 1930-31 droughts was quiet and slow without commotion. Starting in the Midwest and Upper South during the spring of 1930, between March and May, spring rainfall was the lowest on record in Missouri.
Because the drought destroyed crops of a large area, by late summer, it became a national agricultural crisis. In August, President Herbert Hoover, who had directed the flood relief effort in 1927, called a conference of governors from the stricken area. A federal drought relief committee, stated committee, and even local were formed to deal with the problem. In many area, little food and forage was left to support the people in the crisis areas. Hoover opposed federal “doles” to drought victims.
While the federal committee called for federal and stated loans to provide crop seed for the drought-stricken farmers, but did nothing to fill the need for food and forage. Cotton crops were not the only thing affected. Cornfields, gardens, meadows, and pastures dried up and died.
President Hoover handed the problem over to the American Red Cross. With five million dollars in the Red Cross disaster fund, Chairman John Payne was reluctant to provide direct relief to drought victims. This was the same pattern followed during their relief during the 1927 flood giving money and food to the large landowners, however, little of that aid trickled down. His preference was self-help projects such as fall gardens and sowing winter pastures in the drought areas.
As directed by the Red Cross, local chapters distributed packages of garden and pasture seed. As you would think, few of the vegetables the victims planted survived the heat and lack of water. The only vegetables to survive were greens and turnips, which were called “Hoover apples.”
In some of the communities, the planters, they often controlled local Red Cross chapters, feared the seed package and Red Cross rations would discourage their tenants from picking the surviving cotton for reduced wages. They wanted then hungry and desperate. Without the garden crops the croppers would have no choice but to work for less wages, even if weak and hungry.
After the cotton was in, the planters admitted drought relief was needed. Poor grade cotton, short production, and falling prices all together made the 1930 cotton crop worth only a fraction of earlier crops.
In the cotton economy, including Southeast Missouri, farm credit kept the system alive. The fragile plantation credit system, because of the poor cotton crop of 1930, met disaster. Normally, planters borrowed money from bankers to finance their upcoming crop. From these loans planters “advanced” money and supplies to their tenant live off of and plant and raise their crops. After crops were in, the tenant would repay the landowner, who repaid his loan to the bank. With the crop failure of 1930, the cycle was broke as the tenant was unable to repay his loan, so planters defaulted to the banks. Even before this crisis, many of the banks were barley solvent; therefore, many banks closed their doors in late 1930.
With the drought famine growing more acute congressmen from the crisis area called for massive federal aid to help the victims. However, when Congress introduced a bill to provide $60 million in federal loans to drought-stricken farmers, the Hoover administration’s budget director proposed on $25 million for loans. A compromised was reach in December of 1930 for a $45 million farm loan bill. There were no provision for food in the bill; the money was to only be used crop seed and stock feed. The problem of feeding the farm families was left to the Red Cross.
Although Payne’s lack of enthusiasm to provide direct relief to drought victims, by November of 1930 it became obvious that thousands in the coming winter would be dependent on the Red Cross for help. Local Red Cross chapters begin in December giving out food, clothe, and fodder on a “basis of need.” However, they did no simply hand out tons of supplies directly to drought victims. The organization set up a strict bureaucratic procedure. Locally the Red Cross set up relief committees to oversee the relief aid distributed. Committees sent investigators out into the countryside to scrutinize needy families. After questionnaires were filled out the forms were returned to the relief committees who then issued relief orders. Local merchant were distributes of food, clothing, and even fodder. Then the merchant would then bill the Red Cross for reimbursement. Frequently, bureaucratic incompetence delayed Red Cross aid to victims of the 1930 drought.
Southeast Missouri had been baked for months without rain. New Madrid County wad not had rain for 90 days during the growing period in 1930. The area had been dried into complete poverty. Drought and the depression caused dozens of bands to fail. These bank failures were followed by a wage of farm foreclosures
Many renters and farmers lost their tools, mules and land to foreclosure and to be auctioned at the courthouse steps. Yet, it was the poor share croppers that suffered even greater privation. Desperate croppers felt forced to steal corn from farmers’ cribs. They parched these corn kernels in skillets seasoned with a little lard and salt. These desperate croppers were saved from starvation only by Red Cross relief. More than 22,000 Missouri farm families, during the drought, received relief aid.
In 1937, the Corps of Engineers won its first major battle against the Mississippi. Making no claims of taming the river, they could, with satisfaction, knowing that at least in this, some considered the flood of the century.
During the 1927 flood the discharge was about 1,800,000 cubic feet of water per second at Memphis. From New Madrid into Arkansas, the river carried approximately this volume of water. Ten years later, with the Jadwin Plan in effect, the levee carried 2,250,000 cubic feet of water per second. This was 450,000 cubic feet of water per second without a break along the main line Mississippi River levee from Cairo to the Gulf of Mexico.
January 16, 1937, residents of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway received warning they the floodway might have to be opened on short notice. Auto, trucks, and wagon with farmers driving their livestock before they were making their way out of the floodway the next day while all the time they were telling the engineers they would not tolerate them flooding the land. Engineers operating the floodway were to use it then the river water at Cairo reached 37 feet. A prediction by the Weather Bureau had set the crest at 55.5 inches.
As high water offers a serious threat to the Bootheel levees during the spring of 1937, volunteer emergency workers rushed to Charleston to close a break in the live. Joining them were hundreds of Civilian Conservation Corps and Works Progress Administration workers.
On January 18th a private levee in Tennessee was breach flooding a 25 mile long and four miles wide area giving the system some relief. By the end of February, the worst of the threat of flooding was over and the residents of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway were able to return home. They returned with no assurance they would not be forced to move again. Most of the flooding was from back water. Damage from this food was $6.6 million. The flood control project prevented an estimated $19 million in damage.
On the St. Francis River, in 1937, however, six different breaks occurred. On January 19, crevassing flooded about 50,000 acres near Kennett.
Engineers were assisting local flood fighters from Kennett to Paragould during 1945. The substandard levees could not hold and three crevasses occurred causing minor flooding in 1945.
In 1950, the levees along Little River were declared 100 percent complete
In 1964, a review report reviews the New Madrid area for flood control and drainage problems in the area’s tributary, St. John’s Bayou Drainage Structure. After the situation near New Madrid underwent an exhaustive study, the Memphis District Corps of Engineers recommended no flood control or drainage improvements were to be made at that time. However, it was recommended an enlargement and clean out of the Verney River and various other bayous and ditches.
In the Flood Control Act of 1965, a recommendation was made for a modification of the Bird’s Point-New Madrid Floodway. In an effort to provide a higher degree of protection for lands inside the floodway the front line levee be modified to a grade 62.5 feet on the Cairo Gage. The fuse plug area was to have a grade of 60 feet. The floodway was then to be used when the water stage reached 58 feet on the Cairo Gage and a stage higher than 60 feet was forecast.
Three dredges were used on the Mississippi to maintain a nine foot navigation channel in 1971; they were the Burgess, the Ockerson and the Potter. Maintain this nine foot channel was frustrating at times. In a matter of hours the River could dump hundreds of tons of silt into a troublesome stretch.
Near Caruthersville, high water moved a sandbar downstream so fast that a fairly deep channel lost 16 feet of depth in 24 hours. Before a new channel could be dredged through the bar, a dozen tows run aground, including four in just one day.
On March 19, 1973, the Corps of Engineers were assembling at Kaskaskia Island north of Cairo. They met here to evacuate the island’s 300 residences, by force if necessary. At Cairo, there was talk of flooding the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. The highway between Dutch Town and Blomeyer, while not yet closed, was under six to eight inches of water and the bottomland of Cairo there was some residential flooding.
The flood gates at Cairo, Hickman, and Caruthersville were being ordered to be closed as the river at those locations were at flood state. Cairo was critical to any decisions made and determined whether the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway would be opened. Cairo is located on a point of the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The water stages recorded on the Cairo gave reveals the condition of both of the rivers.
The Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway was designed to be placed in operation when a 58 feet water stage was posted at Cairo. A forecast of 60 feet had been posted. April 23, 1973, saw the gage at Cairo at 54.3 and the predicted cress state was continually being enlarged.
Engineers ordered the upper fuse plug section of the levee be raised to an elevation equivalent to 60 feet at Cairo. A review of the 1937 flood prompted this action. During the 1937 flood, the river crest rose three feet in a two day period. While the 1967 prediction has yet included a rise to 60 feet, additional rains could push to river over 58 foot stage to prematurely place the floodway into operation.
Phase II emergency operation were put in place; the levee was to be raised approximately. Bulldozers and other heavy equipment were assembled. Portable light were assembled for the U. S. Air force Base in Blytheville, Arkansas, and the Navy installation at Millington, Tennessee. These were needed as plans were to work around the clock.
On the afternoon of March 23rd the emergency started. The plan was to move approximately 35,000 cubic yards of dirt from the land side of the levee to pile and shape it on top of the levee. As the land was went from the continued rains the heavy equipment was having problems operating. When the dirt was pushed to the top of the levee, the heavy equipment was working only inches for the water which was them within 15 inches for the top.
Within 36 hours, the contractors and District personnel completed raised 11 miles of levee some two feet. Thus the operation prevented major flood in the 130,000 acre floodway, saving $31,285,000 damage within the floodway.
Morehouse Hustler Promotes Little River Valley
“Better than gold mine is a farm in the beautiful Little River Valley.” “Soon the Little River Valley will be known as The Second Nile of the World.” These are two of the claims made about Southeast Missouri by the Morehouse Hustler, December 16, 1910. This idea went nationwide when in New York the Collier’s Weekly on July4, 1909 printed a feature story about the Little River Drainage District and much the same story later printed in the Hustler.
The per capital wealth (for each man, woman, and child) was a little over $2,000 in 1910, according to the 1910 Morehouse Hustler article. The assessed tax rate was one-third its retail value while the state rate was 17 cents and county 50 cents per $100 valuation. These figures were pushed proudly in the Hustler’s unashamedly proclaimed the virtues of Morehouse and the cleared land ready to be converted into farmland.
Claims were made for being able to raise two crops a year. Farming, near Morehouse, the paper proclaimed using the best land in the county would assure to “make a young man rich.” The county side was covered by fine home that have replaced the shacks that one were common. Future buyers were told they were not listing to a fairy tale; “nothing had been with held.”
While the land may have been cleared of timber, stumps by the hundreds on forty acres remained. As heavy equipment was not available, horses, mules, and oxen were of limited value in removing them. The most common means of removing stumps was to dig down under it and then place dynamite in the hole. This was hard dangerous work.
Before the land could be plowed came the problem of clearing the land of all the chunks of stumps scattered by the dynamite. We wouldn’t mention the holes left by the removed stumps. Not only was plowing new ground hard work, it was painful. A single breaking plow was pulled by a single, or pair of animals. The worker walked between plow handles struggling to keep the plow tip in the ground and the row straight. While the main part of the stump had been removed, all the roots had not. When the plow point slid under a big root runner, more often than not, one of the plow handles would deliver a stunning blow to the man plowing.
Everett Dick in his classical 1947 study, The Dixie Frontier claimed single field hand was able to maintain six acres. Thus, large families were encouraged and welcome as their labor was necessary for the farmer. Dick stated that if cotton or other crop was raised, an equal acreage of corn was produced for animal food.
A 1910 edition of the Hustler in praising the growth of Morehouse explained, “The small tenant house that were first built have been replaced by nice painted structures, many of them two story. Instead of a small cleaned patch in the woods, cleared fields were fast replacing the path through the wood. The old wooden bridges across the ditches are being replaced with modern all steel bridges.”
Headlight Plantation, near Canalou, was one of the farms established on the land cleared of timber by Himmelberger and Harrison. Xenophon Caverno, from Wisconsin, bought this land in the southern part of West Township in 1907. His favorite horse, one he bought in Kentucky, he named Headlight, thus the name of his plantation. With the purchase of a Model T, Highlight was retired. Highlight School, a one-room school for blacks was established in the area in 1926.
Honey Island was another area made more accessible as the timber was removed. An island in the southwest part of West Township of New Madrid County was made by the waters of Little River during flood season. The island was named for Mr. “Honey” Johnson, an early settler on Honey Island with the hobby of collecting wild honey.
Selling the Lowland
Morehouse Hustler promotes Little River Valley